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Spinoza, Money, and Desire 
Abstract 
In the context of Spinoza’s psychological and political theory, money 
appears as a profound social problem. I agree with Frédéric Lordon and 
André Orléan that Spinoza’s psychological theory can explain how 
multiple agents can converge on a single monetary good as a means of 
payment. I disagree, however, with their further claim that this 
convergence brings an end to rivalrous conflict among those agents. 
Instead, I argue, it intensifies and concentrates this rivalry, threatening 
the very bonds that hold society together. Yet money is, on Spinoza’s 
account, necessary for commerce, and commerce is necessary for humans 
to live together. The social problem that thus arises is that of ensuring 
that money can play its vital role in supporting commerce without giving 
way to destructive rivalries that can destroy society. My interpretation of 
Spinoza on these points is influenced by the theory of René Girard, with 
which Spinoza’s account has some striking parallels. 
 
1. Introduction 
Although Spinoza has very little to say directly about money, it is hard to believe 
that he did not think much about it. As Beth Lord has argued, ‘money and 
economics are not just of marginal interest to Spinoza: they constitute a key part 
of his thinking about how to live with others’ (Lord 2017). Frédéric Lordon and 
André Orléan propose that:  
The instruments of thought that Spinoza provides in his Treatises, 
particularly in the Political Treatise, in order to account for the genesis 
but also the ruin of the institutions of the State, are, by a striking parallel, 
very susceptible of being put to work on another institutional 
construction: money in market societies. The political order and the 
monetary order are declined by one and the same grammar (Lordon and 
Orléan 2010, 204, my translation here and below). 
Like Lordon and Orléan, I believe that to understand Spinoza’s theory of money, 
it is crucial to understand his theory of desire, particularly its imitative and social 
aspects. Spinoza proposes that when we perceive others to desire something, we 
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come to desire the same thing (3p27s).1 Moreover, we seek to make others 
desire what we desire (3p31c). Orléan, Lordon, and others have observed that 
Spinoza’s theory entails an omnipresent threat of social unrest, grounded in the 
fierce affects that arise out of the dynamics of this imitative or mimetic desire.2 
They have suggested that money can work to contain this threat, even 
transforming its psychological causes into public benefits. But, I aim to show, 
they have not convincingly shown that money resolves rather than intensifying 
the conflict. 
I begin by examining the theory of money that influences Lordon and 
Orléan’s reading of Spinoza, namely the theory that Orléan developed in 
collaboration with Michel Aglietta. The theory is not developed in direct 
reference to Spinoza, but it draws upon a hypothesis of René Girard which, as I 
argue below, has deep resonances with Spinoza’s psychological theory.3 
However, the theory diverges from Girard on one crucial point. And on this 
matter Spinoza and Girard are on one side, Aglietta and Orléan on the other. As a 
result, I argue, Lordon and Orléan’s attempt to apply this monetary theory to 
Spinoza is not entirely successful. I then propose my own suggestions of how 
money fits into Spinoza’s general social and political philosophy. 
2. The Aglietta-Orléan Theory of Money 
In economics textbooks we often find a theory of the origins of money that runs 
as follows: 
Money is anything that serves as a commonly accepted medium of 
exchange. . . .  
As economies develop, people no longer barter one good for another. 
Instead, they sell goods for money and then use money to buy other goods 
they wish to have. . . .  
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[T]wo monetary transactions are simpler than one barter transaction. For 
example, some people may want to buy apples, and some may want to sell 
nuts. But it would be a most unusual circumstance to find a person whose 
desires exactly complement your own – eager to sell nuts and buy apples. 
To use a classic economics phrase, instead of there being a ‘double 
coincidence of wants,’ there is likely to be a ‘want of coincidence’ 
(Samuelson and Nordhaus 2009, 458–59). 
In the textbook story, agents adopt money in order to reduce transaction costs – 
to simplify transactions.4  
But Aglietta and Orléan suggest a different explanation for the origin of 
money. Money, on their view, arises not so much from the need to reduce 
transaction costs but rather from the need to conquer uncertainty: 
We do not know what tomorrow will bring, not even in a probabilistic 
way. Now, by nature commodities [les marchandises] respond to specific 
needs. There are no multifunctional commodities capable of confronting 
an infinite diversity of future circumstances. Thus, faced with this 
indeterminate uncertainty, commodities are useless (Aglietta and Orléan 
2002, ch.2, ‘L’incertidude et la rareté’, my translation here and below). 
This uncertainty, which commodities on their own are powerless to confront, 
leads each economic agent ‘to search in the goods she acquires not only for the 
satisfaction of her immediate needs, but above all for ‘liquidity’, that is to say, for 
the means of procuring future goods’ (Aglietta and Orléan 2002, ch2., ‘La 
question du troc’). Aglietta and Orléan refer to this also as the search for wealth: 
‘to search for wealth is to search for that which is desired by all – it is to search 
for what is universally desirable’ (Aglietta and Orléan 2002, ch2., ‘La question du 
troc’). To hold money is to have access to an indefinite variety of commodities, so 
long as the money is so widely desired that one can exchange it for any 
commodity. In this way the universal desirability of money allows it to be the 
antidote to uncertainty; it allows one to be prepared for the future without 
knowing what one will need in the future. We still must explain, however, how 
money can come to be universally desired. 
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At this point, Aglietta and Orléan introduce a crucial hypothesis, drawn 
from René Girard: the mimetic hypothesis. This hypothesis, as we shall see, 
becomes crucial when Lordon and Orléan explore the Spinozistic aspects of this 
monetary theory. The mimetic hypothesis, as explained by Girard, is as follows: 
Once his basic needs are satisfied (indeed, sometimes even before), man 
is subject to intense desires, though he may not know precisely for what. 
The reason is that he desires being, something he himself lacks and which 
some other person seems to possess. The subject thus looks to that other 
person to inform him of what he should desire in order to acquire that 
being. If the model, who is apparently already endowed with superior 
being, desires some object, the object must surely be capable of 
conferring an even greater plenitude of being (Girard 2013, 164). 
Deep psychological complexities emerge from this situation. No sooner does the 
individual imitate the desires of his model than he wishes to be imitated himself: 
‘he invariably falls back on the formula, “Imitate me!” in order to conceal his own 
lack of originality’ (Girard 2013, 164). Thus the mimetic nature of desire brings 
about a strangely symmetrical situation, in which the subject wishes both to 
imitate the desires of others and to have her own desires imitated. This leads to 
rivalry and ultimately to violence, as Aglietta and Orléan explain: 
Rivalry is a consequence of imitation when, each agent taking the other 
for a model, the desire of the two individuals ends up converging on the 
same object. . . . The polarization of desires on the same object, subject 
and model becoming interchangeable, leads René Girard to call them 
‘mimetic doubles’. This is the situation of maximal violence. In this 
situation, the fact that numerous people desire the same object has no 
pacifying effect. Violence feeds on itself. The greater it is, the more the 
sacrifices are justified, since the protagonists see in it the sign that the 
object in question is of an extraordinary nature. This paradoxical effect is 
typical of the situation of the mimetic double (Aglietta and Orléan 2002, 
ch.2 “L’hypothèse mimétique”).5 
 
Aglietta and Orléan subscribe to Girard’s mimetic hypothesis, but not for 
Girard’s reasons. Whereas Girard propounds a psychological theory, Aglietta and 
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Orléan arrive at his conclusions from premises that are ‘not at all psychological’, 
by which they appear to mean it arises from a specific sort of social situation 
rather than a psychological disposition general to all humans (Aglietta and 
Orléan 2002, ch.2 ‘L’hypothèse mimétique’). Thus they go on: ‘the “lack of being” 
of the market individual, her fundamental incompleteness, finds its source in 
market alienation as a specific sort of social relation’ (Aglietta and Orléan 2002, 
ch.2 ‘L’hypothèse mimétique’). It is the situation of economic uncertainty in 
which the individual finds herself that leads her towards a mimetic desire for 
wealth – that is, to an impulse to desire what others desire and to have others 
desire what she desires. Thus, for Aglietta and Orléan, mimetic desire is specific 
to the capitalist market society. A society in which ties of kinship, solidarity, etc. 
ensure that each agent’s needs will be supplied by others, will not give rise to 
mimetic desire of the sort they describe. Here there is no uncertainty of the 
relevant kind (Aglietta and Orléan 2002, ch.2, ‘L’incertitude et la rareté’). 
The final stage of Aglietta and Orléan’s story is the resolution of the 
mimetic conflict through the emergence of money. At this point their thought 
diverges sharply from that of Girard. It is important to note this difference here, 
as it is relevant to a difference I shall propose between the Aglietta-Orléan theory 
and Spinoza’s thinking. Girard envisages the end of the violent mimetic conflict 
through the convergence of rivalrous animosity onto a single victim – the 
scapegoat. Just as agents mimic each other’s desires, leading to rivalrous conflict, 
they also mimic each other’s resentments, until eventually it converges onto a 
single ‘scapegoat victim’, who is blamed for all the conflict. Aglietta and Orléan 
explain Girard’s theory: 
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The polarisation of all violent desires onto a single victim makes possible 
social peace and designates a culprit for all the evils that the society [cité] 
has experienced. His sacrifice is the occasion for a general reconciliation. 
Individual A ceases to resent Individual B, and vice-versa, since they both 
suddenly discover that their personal rivalry had for its cause the 
maleficent influence that the victim had unknowingly exercised. In 
destroying him, we eradicate the evil. René Girard speaks here of 
‘founding violence’ (Aglietta and Orléan 2002, ch.2, ‘F3 ou la violence 
foundatrice’). 
Moving to the economic case, they propose that:  
In economic matters, we obtain an analogous result. The unanimity on a 
single object, at the same time as it expresses the greatest rivalry, since 
each is directly opposed to all, offers an escape to the producers-
exchangers: the recognition by the whole society of a common definition 
of wealth. . . . This common reference is the product of mimetic violence 
(Aglietta and Orléan 2002, ch.2, ‘F3 ou la violence foundatrice’). 
But it is far from clear how this result is analogous to that of Girard. For him, the 
convergence of all desires on a single object is not the resolution of the mimetic 
conflict; it is its source. Resolution requires a shift away from the object: ‘What is 
crucial for the resolution of [a] crisis is the shift from the desire of the object, 
which divides the imitators, to the hatred of the rival, which reconciles when 
hatred is channelled onto a single victim’ (Girard 2017, 48). 
Aglietta and Orléan’s story does not explain who plays the role of the 
victim in resolving the mimetic crisis they describe. But this apparent gap is 
explained by the chief difference we have seen between their conception and 
that of Girard. For them, as we saw, the tendency towards mimetic desire, and 
thus towards mimetic violence, arises from the situation of economic 
uncertainty. The convergence upon a single monetary commodity removes the 
uncertainty: it allows each agent to hold money, ‘liquidity’, as a flexible means of 
procuring future goods for needs yet unknown. This removes the uncertainty – 
the ‘lack of being’ that leads to mimetic desire and ultimately to rivalry – and so 
it resolves the mimetic conflict. But Girard could not agree with this. For him the 
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source of mimetic conflict is not an economic situation of uncertainty that can be 
remedied by the convergence on a monetary good. It lies much deeper in human 
psychology. 
Lying thus deeper, mimetic conflict can be resolved, according to Girard, 
only in two ways. The first is the scapegoating mechanism described above. But 
the second is by way of a public authority that exercises a monopoly on violence: 
We owe our good fortune to one of our social institutions above all: our 
judicial system, which serves to deflect the menace of vengeance. The 
system does not suppress vengeance; rather, it effectively limits it to a 
single act of reprisal, enacted by a sovereign authority specializing in this 
particular function. The decisions of the judiciary are invariably 
presented as the final word on vengeance. . . . Under the public system, an 
act of vengeance is no longer avenged; the process is terminated, the 
danger of escalation averted (Girard 2013, 16–17). 
I shall argue below that Spinoza similarly views public authority as the necessary 
means to resolve rivalrous conflict (the extent to which he considers Girard’s 
scapegoating mechanism is a topic for another paper). Like Aglietta and Orléan, 
he recognises a process of psychological mimesis, by which desires can be 
focussed on a single monetary commodity. But unlike them, and like Girard, he 
does not see this convergence as a means of resolving conflicts and bringing 
about social unity. On the contrary, for him as for Girard, convergence on a single 
object is a source of conflict. 
3. Spinoza on Mimetic Desire 
To understand how far the Aglietta-Orléan theory of money applies to Spinoza, it 
is worth noting first that Spinoza holds a theory of mimetic desire very similar to 
the Girardian theory upon which Aglietta and Orléan base their analysis. 
Spinoza’s theory of mimetic desire begins with Proposition 27 of Part 3 of the 
Ethics: ‘If we imagine a thing like us, toward which we have had no affect, to be 
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affected with some affect, we are thereby affected with a like affect.’ From this 
arises emulation: ‘the desire for a thing which is generated in us from the fact that 
we imagine others like us to have the same desire’ (3p27s). It is worth noting that 
like Girard, and unlike Aglietta and Orléan, Spinoza sees this tendency as lying 
deep in our psychology and does not explain it by reference to specific economic 
circumstances. 
Spinoza also believes the other side of Girard’s theory: that we seek to 
have others desire what we desire – or more generally to share in our affective 
reactions to things. His explanation of this point is worth quoting in detail: 
each one of us strives, so far as he can, that everyone should love what he 
loves, and hate what he hates. Hence that passage of the poet: 
Speremus pariter, pariter mutuamus amantes; 
Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat. 
This striving to bring it about that everyone should approve his love and 
hate is really ambition. And so we see that each of us, by his nature, wants 
the others to live according to his temperament; when all alike want this, 
they are alike an obstacle to one another, and when all wish to be praised, 
or loved, by all, they hate one another (3p31c, s). 
Later Spinoza points out that ‘for as long as a man is bound by any desire, he 
must at the same time be bound by’ ambition (3app44exp). Not only are we 
highly susceptible to emulating the desires of those around us, then; we are 
incapable of being bound by any desire without trying to stimulate emulation in 
others. It is not clear how Spinoza would deal with apparent counterexamples – 
a baby’s urge for milk does not seem to be obviously accompanied by ambition. 
There is no evidence that he would, as Girard does in a passage quoted above, 
class such an urge as a ‘basic need’ and thus distinguish it from a desire. Perhaps 
he would say that in such a case the baby is not ‘bound’ by desire in the relevant 
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sense. For the purposes of my argument, I assume only that Spinoza believes 
many of the desires that drive economic activity to be accompanied by ambition. 
The lines of poetry that Spinoza quotes are of great significance for 
explaining the role of ambition. They come from a poem in Ovid’s Amores, where 
a lover speaks directly to his rival, enjoining him to continue acting as a rival in 
order to fuel his passion for his beloved. Directly before them the poem opens 
with the following lines: 
You fool, if it does not serve you to jealously guard the girl, 
Do it for my sake – it makes me want her more! 
What is permitted is undesirable; what is not is more keenly desired.6 
If the lovers’ rivalry were simply a chance convergence of two desires on one 
object, the speaker in the poem could prefer for his rival to find a different girl, 
leaving him to pursue his beloved uncontested. But he knows that his love arises 
from emulation: the condition of its existence is the perceived presence of the 
same love in his rival. The speaker wants the rival to at least act as though he 
pursues the same girl, otherwise the speaker himself will find his own love 
weakening and vacillating.  
As Girard puts it: ‘Our desires are not really convincing until they are 
mirrored by the desires of others’ (Girard 2000, 14). Or, in Spinoza’ terms, 
emulation leads to ambition: the speaker in the poem not only emulates the love 
of his rival, he also wishes for the rival to emulate his own love in return. Yves 
Citton explains Spinoza’s theory in these terms:  
Spinoza signals with Proposition 31 that the imitation of the affects is not 
only the cause of the harmonisation of desires and their inter-individual 
comportments. It is also, equally, the cause of the intra-mental 
consolidation of the affects experienced by each individual. . . . Put 
otherwise: I cannot affirm “my” desire except to the extent that it is 
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affirmed in me by the confirmation received from the desires I imagine in 
others (Citton 2010, 127, my translation). 
Ambition and emulation thus foster each other in a feedback loop. The lover 
desires his object because the rival desires it, and is led by ambition to encourage 
the rival the be an obstacle to his own desire. Thus Spinoza writes: ‘each of us, by 
his nature, wants the others to live according to his own temperament’ – that is, 
to desire what we desire, and thus: ‘when all alike want this, they are all alike an 
obstacle to one another’ (3p31c). The last clause is important. While there are 
benign cases, in which our desire to have our desire emulated leads to socially 
beneficial effects (Spinoza explicitly acknowledges this at 4app25), and there 
might well be cases that are neither benign nor malignant, the overall effect of 
the striving to be emulated in our desires is to make us obstacles to one another 
in Spinoza’s view. 
Is this situation inevitable? Spinoza’s propositions do not appear to have 
universal application. One of his early critics, Christoph Wittich, complained that 
3p31 describes a situation that often occurs but does not always occur: ‘it is not 
universal and thus not demonstrable’ (Wittich 1690, 194, my translation). 
Taking up the clue from the discussion of Ovid, however, we might suppose 
Spinoza’s answer to point to a fundamental insecurity that all of us share to some 
extent. None of us is ‘made of iron’; everybody will sometimes doubt that the 
things she desires are really worthy of her desire, and everyone will be tempted, 
in that situation, to try to get others to imitate her desire as a way of testing the 
worthiness of the objects.7 We reason, perhaps unconsciously, that it is far less 
likely that an object is not really worthy of desire if many desire it, and are 
willing to fight over it. 
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Spinoza’s next proposition in his excursus on desire is: ‘If we imagine that 
someone enjoys some thing that only one can possess, we shall strive to bring it 
about that he does not possess it’ (3p32). This is intuitive enough. But it must be 
noted that, on his theory, our ambition is likely to prevent us from bringing 
simply persuading the other not to covet the same object. Instead, we can easily 
find ourselves in a double-bind like that of the speaker in Ovid’s poem: we want 
our rival to keep wanting the object that only one can possess, since this 
confirms its worthiness to us; and yet we want ourselves to possess the object.  It 
is easy to see how this makes a situation of rivalry very likely to arise, and how 
this can lead to violence. Hobbes, who certainly influenced Spinoza, claimed in 
his Leviathan that: 
the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other, ariseth 
hence, that many men at the same time have an appetite to the same 
thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet 
divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is 
strongest must be decided by the sword (Hobbes 1949, 1.6, 26). 
 
But here we might pause: how many goods are there that can truly be 
neither enjoyed in common nor divided? Apples can be sliced. Land can be used 
in common. A beautiful artwork can be placed in a museum where we can all 
take turns enjoying it, roomful by roomful. Even romantic partners can be 
shared, if only the parties concerned can control their envy. But if desire is 
mimetic then the hope of dividing an object into equally valuable parts, whether 
temporal or spatial, is always precarious. There will be, in addition to the desire 
for the object, a desire for exclusivity, to which Hobbes refers in his definition of 
‘covetousness’: ‘Desire of Riches: COVETOUSNESSE: a name used alwayes in 
signification of blame; because men contending for them, are displeased with 
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one anothers attaining them’ (Hobbes 1968, 1.6, 123). Hobbes does not explain 
whence covetousness arises. But Spinoza’s theory of ambition can readily fill the 
gap: what we want is not only to possess our object but also to have others want 
it. This is impossible if these others are satisfied with their own equivalent 
objects or portions. Ambition leads us, via covetousness, to strive to bring it 
about that we possess what others want, in both the archaic and modern senses 
of ‘want’. We must take seriously the psychological sources of the Ovidian 
double-bind. 
Ambition thus appears to be capable of undermining any simple 
allocation mechanism. It is not enough to divide up goods equally, or according 
to some principle, since what people desire is more than just the goods 
themselves. There is a social component to desire, captured in the notions of 
emulation, ambition, and covetousness. This leads to a profound political 
problem. The tendency to rivalry pushes humans towards a war of all against all: 
a struggle for exclusive possession of objects that their own psychology rather 
than the nature of the objects prevents them from sharing. Can the institution of 
money be of any use here, as the Aglietta-Orléan theory suggests? Was Spinoza in 
any sense aware of this possibility? We now turn to Spinoza’s comments on 
money to explore these questions. 
4. Money as a Pacifying Instrument? 
Spinoza’s brief discussion of money in the Ethics begins as follows: 
the human body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, 
which require continuous and varied food so that the whole body may be 
equally capable of doing everything which can follow from its nature, and 
consequently, so that the mind may also be equally capable of conceiving 
many things. 
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Now to achieve these things the powers of each man would hardly be 
sufficient if men did not help one another. But money has provided a 
convenient instrument for acquiring all these aids (4app27-8). 
Spinoza does not say why the powers of each person are insufficient to provide 
her with the varied sustenance life requires if people do not offer help one 
another. But a similar passage in the Theological-Political Treatise goes into more 
detail: 
if men were not willing to give mutual assistance to one another, they 
would lack both skill and time to sustain and preserve themselves as far 
as possible. Not all men are equally capable of all things, and no one 
would be able to provide the things which a man alone needs most. 
Everyone, I say, would lack both the strength and the time, if he alone had 
to plow, to sow, to reap, to grind, to cook, to weave, to sew, and to do the 
many other things necessary to support life—not to mention now the arts 
and sciences which are also supremely necessary for the perfection of 
human nature and for its blessedness ( Spinoza 2016c, 143, III/73). 
The highest level of production, of both material and spiritual goods, is achieved 
when each agent can produce that which she is most skilled at producing while 
all agents can consume the full range of goods produced.  
The passage is reminiscent of a discussion in the second book of Plato’s 
Republic. Socrates remarks that: ‘more things are produced, and better and more 
easily when one man performs one task according to his nature, at the right 
moment, and at leisure from other occupations’ (Plato 2013, 370c). And then a 
little later: 
‘But again, within the city itself how will they share with one another the 
products of their labor? This was the very purpose of our association and 
establishment of a state.’ ‘Obviously’, he said, ‘by buying and selling.’ ‘A 
market-place, then, and money as a token for the purpose of exchange 
will be the result of this’ (Plato 2013, 371b). 
Notice that Socrates views exchange as the link between the division of labour 
and money. But while Spinoza claims that ‘money has provided a convenient 
instrument’ for bringing about the aids of the division of labour is that, we have 
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seen that the mimetic nature of desire can threaten the smooth operation of 
voluntary exchange according to his psychological theory. For exchange requires 
complementary desires, whereas emulation and ambition tend towards 
convergent desires. 
This last point is explained by Aglietta and Orléan:  
In effect, the place B is supposed to occupy in the exchange-relation 
supposes that his own goods lack use-value [for him]. But the desire of B 
is in every way the same as that of A. He seeks the recognition of the 
other. For this, he must prove that he desires the object he possesses, that 
is to say it comes to have use-value. But in this way the exchange-relation 
is reversed. . .  (Aglietta and Orléan 1984, 39). 
Exchange requires a situation in which A possesses s, B possesses t, A desires t, 
and B desires s. This is represented in the following table: 
Agent Possesses: Desires: 
A s t 
B t s 
 
The symmetry of goods desired and goods possessed makes exchange appear 
possible. But suppose we start from this situation and then B emulates A’s desire 
(perhaps encouraged by A’s ambition), and B emulates A’s desire. A’s desire for t 
spreads to B, and B’s desire for s spreads to A. Now their desires will converge 
rather than coinciding: 
Agent Possesses: Desires: 
A s s and t 
B t s and t 
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Voluntary peaceful exchange is now less likely and violent rivalry more likely: 
both agents have intense desires for both goods – desires that strengthen as they 
feed upon each other. Aglietta and Orléan conclude the passage quoted above: 
‘we are led irrevocably towards the destructive violence of doubles, which 
radically excludes the double coincidence of wants by which barter could be 
made possible’ (Aglietta and Orléan 1984, 39). Spinoza’s psychological theory 
thus raises a problem that does not occur to Plato’s Socrates. As Abba Lerner 
once wrote: ‘An economic transaction is a solved political problem’ (Lerner 
1972, 259). In order to understand how, on Spinoza’s theory, money can function 
as a useful instrument of exchange, we must first understand how he solves the 
political problem of mimetic, rivalrous conflict. 
It is I hope uncontroversial to claim that Spinoza’s solution to most 
political problems is the creation of a sovereign authority. Not long after the 
passage quoted above, Spinoza writes: ‘no society can continue in existence 
without authority and force, and hence, laws which moderate and restrain men’s 
immoderate desires and unchecked impulses’ ( Spinoza 2016c, 144, III/74). He 
also believes that people can be a help rather than a hindrance to each other to 
the extent that they are guided by reason, as he explains for instance in 4p35c2 
and 4p37s2. But there and elsewhere, he counsels caution: only very few can be 
led by reason all the time, and the authority of the state will always be necessary 
to maintain order (Spinoza 2016c, III/191). 
  Lordon and Orléan, however, imply that money can provide a remedy for 
mimetic conflict that is independent of both authority and guidance by reason. 
How much room is there for this theory in Spinoza? 
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Lordon and Orléan suppose that money can express ‘the power of the 
multitude’, which, according to Alexandre Matheron, is capable of bringing about 
a sort of emergent social order through the affects of the multitude. In 
developing this notion of emergent social order, Lordon and Orléan draw heavily 
upon one passage in the Political Treatise, which reads as follows: 
Men . . .  are guided more by affect than by reason. So a multitude 
naturally agrees, and wishes to be led, as if by one mind, not because 
reason is guiding them, but because of some common affect. As we said in 
iii, 9, they have a common hope, or fear, or a common desire to avenge 
some harm. Moreover, all men fear being alone, because no one alone has 
the strength to defend himself, and no one alone can provide the things 
necessary for life. So by nature men desire a civil order (Spinoza 2016a, 
532, III/297). 
Lordon and Orléan propose that: 
It is this common affect that binds [soude] the group and, in doing so, 
engenders it and gives to it its specific power, both in the case of the 
political society [cité] and in that of the monetary society (Lordon and 
Orléan 2010, 210). 
They thus develop a model of spontaneous order, in which the free play of affects 
gives rise to a common affect capable of binding together the society under a 
common authority. ‘Far from the fiction of the social contract, this model 
proposes to think the state and money as an endogenous product of individual 
interests’ (Lordon and Orléan 2010, 218). 
 It is here that Lordon and Orléan cite Matheron’s story of how the social 
order emerges: 
If one [agent] judges that the public should take the side of X1, he will do 
the same. And if he has guessed rightly, there will be disposed in his 
favour not only X1 but also a large number of other people. Now each will 
do the same. . . . X1, in consequence, benefits from a massive help, and X2, 
incapable of resisting, is legitimately crushed. All, unanimously, as if they 
have formed together a unique individual, punish those who defy the 
common opinion and protect those who follow it (Matheron 1969, 323). 
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In this way, ‘a collective discipline is installed’. This collective discipline can then 
curb the tendency to mimetic violence. On Lordon and Orléan’s reading, 
Matheron’s model is itself driven by mimesis: 
This dynamic that Matheron exposes in a very detailed manner is an 
illustration of the laws of affective life presented in Part 3 of the Ethics. 
The mechanism of the imitation of the affects . . . plays a central role 
(Lordon and Orléan 2010, 228–29).8 
Thus, like Aglietta and Orléan with Girard’s scapegoating model, Lordon and 
Orléan attempt to translate Matheron’s model to explain the emergence and role 
of money. But in this case, as in the first, the translation is incomplete. 
In the pre-monetary ‘state of nature’, each agent seeks “market power”, 
which is, for Lordon and Orléan, ‘the ability to make other traders recognise 
one’s own goods as an acceptable means of payment.’ They go on: 
This particular form of social recognition of private products is 
immediately the stake for competitive conflicts, specific expressions of a 
marketised order of power struggles that are a type of agonistic 
tendencies of the conatus (Lordon and Orléan 2010, 220–21). 
But then ‘mimetic interactions’ drive an identical dynamic to the one described 
by Matheron in the political domain (Lordon and Orléan 2010, 231). Increasingly 
all agents take the side of a single protagonist in the power struggle, until that 
protagonist’s proper good is universally accepted as the means of payment: the 
monetary unit of account.9 The modern market economy, complete with a 
common currency, is now in place, and agents can now mutually benefit from the 
division of labour and trade. 
Yet in a Spinozist context this story runs against a very serious problem. 
We have seen that, according to Spinoza, we strive that others both desire and do 
not possess what we desire. If a society converges on a monetary unit, everyone 
will desire to possess money thus defined. But will this desire not become 
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covetous, as Hobbes thought the love of riches always to be? Why would a 
common desire for a single good not lead to rivalrous struggles for exclusive 
possession of that good: a situation in which ‘all are alike an obstacle to one 
another’ rather than one in which ‘all, together, . . . seek for themselves the 
common advantage of all’ (4p18s)? 
In fact, as we shall see in the next section, some of Spinoza’s comments 
about money, especially when read in his historical context, suggest that it can be 
a source of mimetic rivalry rather than an instrument of economic order. The 
sources of order and unity in a monetised market economy must lie elsewhere. 
5. Money and the Political Problem 
A potential reply to the objection just raised could pick up on the specific 
formulation of 3p32: ‘If we imagine that someone enjoys some thing that only 
one can possess, we shall strive to bring it about that he does not possess it’ 
(emphasis added). We should not take too literally the highlighted phrase. Some 
sort of joint possession can, as we have seen, be possible in principle in nearly 
every case. What Spinoza is likely to have meant by ‘some thing that only one can 
possess’, however, is something such that the more of it one person uses or 
consumes, the less there is for others to use or consume. This is a rivalrous good, 
the desire for which is covetous in Hobbes’s sense. Perhaps we could defend 
Lordon and Orléan’s suggestion that the quest for money, and the convergence 
on the monetary unit, can lead to harmony rather than a struggle for exclusive 
possession, on the grounds that money is not a rivalrous good. 
In an essay on property, Matheron proposes something like this. Money, 
being ‘infinitely reproducible’ need not give way to rivalrous conflict in his view 
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(Matheron 2011, 254–58). The money-seeking activities of commercial 
competitors can yield monetary returns to all parties; this can be a positive-sum 
game in which ‘all can simultaneously enrich themselves by working and saving’. 
Moreover, since what all parties desire is money in general, not any specific 
money-thing, they need not become obstacles to each other’s pursuits:  
when two individuals possess an equal sum of money they have no 
motive to mutual envy, since it is not the same pieces of metal but rather 
the same sum, and that alone, which counts in their eyes (Matheron 2011, 
257–58) .10 
But there are many problems with this account.  
In the first place, as Lord notes, ‘Even if Matheron is right that Spinoza 
understands money to be “infinitely reproducible”, this does not entail that it can 
be held by all equally’ (Lord 2017). Lord gives some reasons why, due to the 
structure of the economy in Spinoza’s time as well as ours, money can almost 
certainly not be held by all equally (Lord 2017, 2016). Moreover, the very value 
of the money held in surplus by some lies in the lack of it felt by others; as John 
Ruskin put it: 
. . . riches are a power like that of electricity, acting only through 
inequalities or negations of itself. The force of the guinea you have in your 
pocket depends wholly on the default of a guinea in your neighbour’s 
pocket (Ruskin 1985, ‘The Veins of Wealth’, 180-1) 
The condition of holding more money than others – i.e., relative wealth – is a 
rivalrous good, and as such can easily be the source of mimetic conflict.  
This effect is compounded by ambition. Continuing the passage on money 
quoted above, Spinoza mentions those who: ‘seek money neither from need nor 
on account of necessities, but because they have learned the art of making money 
and aggrandise themselves for it very much’ (4app29).11 Here he echoes 
Aristotle, who condemns as unnatural what he calls χρηματιστική – a close 
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equivalent to what Spinoza calls ‘artes lucri’ (Aristotle 1932, 1.9). Aristotle, while 
clearly regarding χρηματιστική as the symptom of some sort of pathology, does 
not go as far as to diagnose it. But Spinoza provides a diagnosis: the person who 
seeks money for its own sake does it from a desire to aggrandise herself. But 
someone who seeks to aggrandise herself seeks status, and status is, by its very 
nature, a rivalrous good: its value obviously diminishes the more it is shared. It is 
thus not surprising, then, that in a letter to Jarig Jelles Spinoza states that 
‘Republics which have an insatiable desire for honor and money must 
necessarily perish’ (Spinoza 2016b, 2:391, IV/228). Rivalry puts people at odds 
with one another, and an internally conflicted republic must perish. 
Matheron therefore shows more naïvety than Spinoza in proposing that 
the infinite reproducibility of money can exclude covetousness, ambition, envy, 
and the like from the pursuit of it. Matheron’s mistake is to see the competitive 
quest for monetary wealth as a positive-sum game. If it were a quest for absolute 
wealth this could be. But the quest for money is generally a quest for relative 
wealth. This must be a zero-sum game. It easily gives way to intense feelings of 
ambition, and those who begin by seeking money for its power to purchase what 
they desire can easily turn to seeking it only to aggrandise themselves. As such, 
the quest for money is guaranteed to create passions that divide people rather 
than unifying them. As Lord describes it: 
if money cannot be equally held, the society will be rife with passions. 
Envy increases as good fortune increases; as the rich get richer, the poor 
hate them all the more, and the rich fear and hate the poor in return (cf. 
5p10s). . . . When people are subject to these passions, they are contrary 
to each other and easily come into conflict (Lord 2017). 
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No doubt Spinoza believed that the pursuit of money, in some sense, could 
promote peace and unity. Matheron refers to a passage in the Political Treatise, 
where Spinoza implies that a policy that forced citizens ‘to engage in business 
dealings which are either entangled with one another or require the same means 
to succeed’ would favour peaceful harmony, since people would then see their 
interests as being aligned (Matheron 2011, 258; Spinoza 2016a, 548, III/311). 
But engaging in commerce is not the same as pursuing money. If those pursuing 
money seek it only as, in Spinoza’s terms, ‘a convenient instrument for acquiring 
[the] aids’ of commerce, then this can lead towards unity. Commerce, at least in 
the best case, is a non-rivalrous good: if the trades are positive-sum then the 
more I benefit from commerce the more others benefit from it also.12 Society is 
unified and strengthened to the extent that people desire commerce itself and 
strive to cause others to do the same through ambition, the positive version of 
which Spinoza calls ‘honour’ (4p37s1). 
Such a positive development is, however, perpetually threatened by the 
process of affective mimesis that tends towards a convergence on money as an 
object of rivalrous desire instead of on commerce as a positive-sum activity. The 
multitude, Spinoza tells us, become preoccupied with the idea of money, since 
‘they can imagine hardly any species of joy without the accompanying idea of 
money as its cause’ (4app28). The mere association of money with various goods 
– those for which money is typically exchanged – draws the mind of the 
multitude to desire money itself rather than the goods of commerce, through 
certain psychological laws of association (3p14, p16). 
Spinoza was well placed to understand the way that the rivalry and 
distrust caused by the quest for money can ruin the benefits of commerce. First, 
 22 
there was the famous tulip crisis that occurred when Spinoza was a young child. 
In this crisis, Lord comments: ‘The upwardly-spiralling desire for money led 
people to speculate on the market in the future price of bulbs’ (Lord 2017). The 
subsequent crash and collapse of prices created a general attitude of distrust. 
Anne Goldgar reports how: 
the damage was, for the most part, not financial. It was the confusion of 
values, the breakdown of honor, and the destruction of trust bound up in 
the events of the 1630s that caused this damage to Dutch society. These 
led, at the very least, to bitter disputes and anger, and even, it seems, to a 
questioning of truth and of reality itself (Goldgar 2008, 303). 
The string of defaults and write-downs, in which creditors and debtors sought to 
minimise their losses by pushing them onto others, created a crisis of distrust. 
Creditors seemed to have a very difficult time recovering their debts.13 This in 
turn made ordinary commerce more difficult to pursue. 
A general atmosphere of distrust drives a monetary crisis deeper. Savers 
attempt to maximise their money-holdings to insulate themselves from risk, 
minimising their spending and thus reducing the incomes of others.14 This 
process leads to a rivalrous process in which each agent tries to spend less than 
she earns. In accounting terms this is only possible if others spend more than 
they earn.15 Saving becomes, in a low-investment environment, another rivalrous 
good: a general pursuit of savings thus becomes a rivalrous power-struggle in 
which each person seeks to save by driving others to dis-save, while the others 
want it the other way around. Competitive non-spending is, of course, terrible for 
commerce. Worse, rivalry installs a threat of violence into the commercial 
environment. A striking example is found in the report that investment in the 
building of a new synagogue in Amsterdam was postponed in 1672, for fear of 
arousing envious hostility (de Vries and van der Woude 1997, 674). 
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Money, in Spinoza’s theory, appears as a profoundly ambivalent 
institution, and monetary commerce a precarious one. The mere use of money 
for commercial purposes threatens, through the psychological laws of 
association and mimesis, to drive a rivalrous quest for relative wealth among the 
multitude. Far from giving rise to a spontaneous solution to a political problem, 
as Lordon, Orléan, and Matheron suggest, the convergence of desires onto the 
monetary good gives rise to a version of the political problem described by 
Sandra Field: 
 the multitude . . . is . . . prone to abusive and hostile relations, as antisocial 
passions are constantly generated by simple human experiences of 
scarcity, frustration, and misfortune. . . . To ensure that people negotiate 
their differences of power in healthy rather than abusive ways, creating 
rather than destroying social bonds, it is necessary for a society to work 
to create the conditions which generate the sociable passions, and limit 
the ramifications of the antisocial ones. In this project, the institutions of 
the state occupy an ambivalent role (Field 2016, 150–51). 
The institution of money is similarly ambivalent. The more goods commerce 
brings, inevitably associated with money, the more likely the multitude is to 
regard money itself as the cause of the goods (rather than the help of their fellow 
humans). They will then develop a desire for money itself and, combining this 
with ambition, begin to practice the artes lucri in their most rivalrous and 
dangerous forms. Commerce therefore includes a natural tendency towards 
monetary rivalry, with which it is ultimately incompatible since one depends on 
social unity and the other destroys it. 
6. Conclusion 
I have examined Lordon and Orléan’s attempt to apply the Aglietta-Orléan theory 
of money to Spinoza. The theory applies well because Spinoza shares the 
psychological theory of mimetic desire that underlies it. The Aglietta-Orléan 
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theory that money is the result of desires converging on a single good by way of 
mimesis fits comfortably into the framework of Spinoza’s psychological theory. 
But a difference emerges where the Aglietta-Orléan theory views this 
convergence as a positive effect, capable of ending rivalrous conflict and bringing 
about social order. On the contrary, while Spinoza holds that commerce can have 
these effects, the desire for money itself is a potential source of rivalrous conflict, 
as Spinoza was in a good historical position to recognise. Worse still, commerce 
depending on a monetary instrument can become a victim of its own success; as 
‘the multitude’ associate the instrument with the benefits it brings, they begin to 
pursue it as an end in itself.  
 I propose that Spinoza emphasises these features of money in a way that 
Aglietta and Orléan (and, for that matter, Lordon and Matheron) do not because 
his theory of mimesis, like that of Girard, traces mimetic effects to a much deeper 
psychological source. For Aglietta and Orléan, as we saw, mimetic effects arise 
only from economic uncertainty. Uncertainty leads people to seek liquidity, as an 
insurance against it, which leads to a striving that others desire what they desire. 
But for Spinoza, as for Girard, the root of mimetic effects is a much deeper 
existential uncertainty: our perpetual insecurity about the true worthiness of the 
things we value and desire. This is not resolved by acquiring liquidity; on the 
contrary, liquidity itself can become the locus of further rivalry. To confirm my 
desire to hold liquid wealth, I need others around me to actively pursue the 
same. This leads readily to a rivalrous, zero-sum contest for relative wealth, 
which can, as Spinoza would have been well aware, turn violent in extreme cases. 
Money is socially useful, but it does not provide a unique solution to the problem 
of rivalrous desire; very easily it can become part of the problem.  
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1  Spinoza 1996, Part 3, Proposition 27, Scholium. All in-text references are in 
this format and refer to this work. 
2 The term is, of course, drawn from René Girard – see below. 
3 The reader may also wish to note the several references to Spinoza in Orléan 
2014. 
4 It is not, however, clear how this could occur, since the selection of any 
commodity is, in game-theoretic terms, a focal point rather than an equilibrium 
(Hahn 1989). A helpful interdisciplinary study of this problem is found in 
Peacock 2013. 
5 See also Girard 2013, 166. 
6 Si tibi non opus est servata, stulte, puella, 
     At mihi fac serves, quo magis ipse velim! 
Quod licet, ingratum est; quod non licet acrius urit. 
- Amores 2.19, in Ovid 1989. 
7 The account here follows that given in Douglas 2016. 
8 See also: Lordon 2011. 
9 Lordon and Orléan note how this implies that the individuals who come to 
compose the state are very often (though not always) the same as those who 
become the monopoly producers of the means of payment, since they arise by 
the same process (Lordon and Orléan 2010, 259). 
10 See Spinoza’s letter to Jelles of 2 June 1674: Spinoza 2016b, 2:406, II/239–40b. 
11 I have modified Curley’s translation of ‘se magnifice’. Curley has ‘pride 
themselves’ but I wish to avoid confusion with ‘superbia’, which Curley translates 
elsewhere as ‘pride’. See, e.g. Spinoza 1996, 84, II/159. 
12 In addition, as Lord notes, ‘the marketplace is an opportunity to develop more 
rational interactions with others’ – also a common good (Lord 2017). 
13 For some evidence of this see, e.g.: (Pieter de la Court 1746, 110; Vega 1939, 
28) 
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14 De Vries and van der Woude report that: ‘Dutch households must have held 
cash balances so large as to suggest hoarding’ (de Vries and van der Woude 
1997, 91). 
15 An old but still accurate explanation of this point is found in (Robinson 1969, 
10–13). 
